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Recovering democracy : problems and 
solutions to the Guyana quagmire 
 
by Ralph R. PREMDAS1 
Professor of Public Policy 
University of the West Indies 
St. Augustine 
Trinidad and Tobago 
 
 
 
 
 
In 1992 when free and fair elections were conducted for the first 
time since 1964 in Guyana, a brief euphoric moment of positive 
change was simultaneously accompanied by a set of long term 
difficulties which five years later would return to haunt the nation 
reducing its democratic prospects to shambles. The Carter Center was 
the midwife which delivered the electoral triumph overseeing a deeply 
embedded proclivity of the ruling Peoples National Congress (PNC) to 
rig elections. While this benefitted Guyanese in restoring democracy, 
the change failed to alter the fundamentals of the Guyanese 
institutional order which in the first instance accounted for the 
communal strife. More specifically, the Carter people in their intense 
preoccupation with sanitizing the mechanical minutiae of the electoral 
machinery, lost sight of the perverse political institutions involving 
zero-sum competition for office which virtually conferred total control 
of the state to one community denying participation to the defeated 
other. A new government was erected on an old discredited order akin 
to an incompetent physician who uses Band-Aid to cure cancer. The 
facts of the case suggest that the Carter people had enough leverage to 
 
                                                          
1. Ralph R. Premdas has written extensively on communal conflict. His recent 
books include Ethnic Conflict and Development : The Case of Guyana, Avebury, 1996 
and Ethnic Conflict in Fiji, Avebury, 1997. His larger work on resolving inter-ethnic 
conflict has been published in Ethnic Conflict and Modes of Accomodation : Problems 
and Possibilities, Inaugural Lecture, University of the West Indies, 1998. 
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compel the victor in the elections to initiate meaningful reform of the 
political system as a condition for ratification of its victory. Rather, a 
faint undertaking by the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) to establish a 
government of national unity and reform the constitution was accepted 
without the means to enforce these promises. The PPP proceeded 
merrily to ignore these undertakings, failed to put in place an inclusive 
cross-party government and engaged in dilatory tactics about 
constitutional reform. While it did succeed in restoring much health to 
the economy giving this item first priority, it effectively ignored the 
political apparatus against which it chafed for decades while out of 
power. One can therefore argue that what was accomplished in the 
1992 elections was simply a change of governing decision-makers 
from the PNC to the PPP under the same system that had done 
irreparable harm to the Guyanese people. After the 1997 general 
elections which the PPP won by successfully mobilising the Indian 
bloc vote, the chicken came home to roost. The defeated PNC decided 
to camouflage the fear of its permanent exclusion from power and 
possible subordination of the African community forever, by 
contesting the accuracy of the election results and taking to the streets. 
Following the demonstrations of the PNC which continued to 
command solid African solidarity, a virtual brokenback state has 
prevailed with the defeated PNC in control of the main cities, the 
public bureaucracy and the all of the coercive forces, police and army 
included. The PPP has the rest but literally governs within the jaws of 
the Opposition strongholds in the capital city, Georgetown. At one 
level, it can be argued that the PNC alone is responsible for the 
stalemate that now has crippled economic investment and placed daily 
Indian-African relations on a razor’s edge. While at this level, there is 
some truth to this argument, at a more fundamental level, the problem 
points to the deficiencies of the zero-sum constitutional order which 
has exacerbated inter-ethnic malaise and crippled the authoritative 
centers of decision-making undermining their legitimacy in the eyes of 
one of the two ethnic communities which need to cooperate if the state 
should survive and prosper. A CARICOM brokered peace has now 
pointed its attention to reforming the constitutional system. A 
facilitator has been appointed to ensure that the effort at reform is not 
strangled by dilatory tactics or partisan obstructionism by either the 
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PPP or the PNC. This paper offers an analysis of the fundamental 
problems of the Guyanese political order and suggests directions in 
which change towards inter-ethnic reconciliation and political 
consociation may proceed. Before I go on, it will be useful to look 
briefly at certain theoretical and comparative aspects of resolving 
communal conflicts generally since this will bear heavily in the 
outcome of the talks to find a solution to the Guyana quagmire.  
The crux of the problem pertains to the establishment of a 
generally acceptable, just, and democratic government in the midst of 
deeply distrusting communal components in Guyana and similar states 
including Trinidad and Suriname in the Caribbean. Implicated in all of 
this are vexing issues related to status and recognition of the ethno-
cultural communities which express fears of discrimination and 
domination as well as charges of skewed state policies regarding 
resource allocation. Short of destroying the state, the basic task is to 
design a framework of government that will accommodate the 
divergent claims of the respective communities for equity and 
representation, the way they see it. In part, the point about this paper is 
precisely to explore the possibilities of designing such a system. There 
are numerous cases of failed efforts in finding a formula for inter-
ethnic accommodation, but there are a few success stories which offer 
some hope. Insights offered in this paper derive in part from examining 
these cases. Many of the solutions that work tend to be short term and 
ad hoc. However there are enough of these to offer insights into what 
may be done in certain circumstances bearing in mind the limits of 
cross-cultural transfers of social technology.  
In most multi-ethnic states, the mode of regulating communal 
strife varies over time ranging from periods of oppression to moments 
of accommodation. Cultural pluralism tends to throw up persistent 
problems in establishing stable inter-sectional co-existence. Peaceful 
accommodative practices appear to be rare events and when they do 
occur they tend to be of relatively short duration. Generally, from the 
evidence, it is clear that the most prevalent policies and practices that 
states apply in coping with cultural diversity points to domination and 
repression. Sometimes drastic measures are employed to destroy 
« once and for all » rival ethno-cultural divisions through assimilation, 
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genocide, population expulsion or partition. As a general rule, these 
modes of ethnic conflict management tend to be counterproductive. 
Multi-ethnicity and cultural diversity persist and rarely can they be 
entirely erased or suppressed.  
The history of most multi-ethnic states is a veritable repository 
of varied experiments and experiences in regulating inter-communal 
living. The solutions span a repertoire ranging from power-sharing and 
consociation on the conciliatory side of a continuum to communal 
oppression and exploitation on the domination side There are many 
modalities in between as Figure I shows. 
FIGURE I 
Negative side 
[genocide – assimilation – partition – forced population transfer-
forced domination/repression – legal hegemonic domination] 
Positive side 
[consociation – bargaining – decentralization – balance 
arbitration – multi-culturalism – liberal democracy] 
 
Most polyethnic states have evolved a pattern of inter-communal 
regulation which, however stable, tends to undergo periodic crises and 
breakdowns. In a single case history, various modes of ethnic conflict 
resolution including a wide range of contradictory and inconsistent 
modalities on the continuum from left to right can be discovered. Very 
often a multi-ethnic state which searches for a solution to its communal 
crisis may discover insights from its own experience and history rather 
than in alien imports. In the case of Guyana, there was a period in 1953 
of inter-ethnic accomodation which offers insights into the practical 
possibilities of reconciliation. 
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What I am also saying is that in the end whatever policy 
proposals are recommended to regulate and resolve an inter-ethnic 
crisis should not be treated as the transfer of mere technical devices 
that can be conveniently and neutrally inserted in an ethnic conflict to 
provide a quick fix. Each strategy of ethnic conflict resolution is not 
only culture specific to a substantial extent but it tends to embody a 
contest over cultural claims and the distribution of symbolic and 
material values. This is the fulcrum on which turns issues of equity in 
claims and counter claims among ethnic communities in conflict2. At 
bottom, the issues and the mode of resolution are political, cultural and 
ethical. This should point towards a critical process of formulating 
policy options that are at once cognizant of and sensitive to cultural 
contexts. Before we proceed to set forth a diagnosis and prescription 
for Guyana’s ethnic malaise, it will be useful to provide a background 
into the society and its politics. 
PART I. - THE MAKING OF AN ETHNIC STATE AND THE 
STRUCTURING OF COMMUNAL IDENTITIES 
Essential to the analysis of Guyana’s communal strife is the 
creation of an « ethnic state », a concept that alludes to the descensus 
in the social demographic structure created by colonialism. The multi-
ethnic state in Guyana, as in many parts of the Third World, was a 
colonial artifact. State and nation were not co-terminus entities ; rather, 
the colonial state deliberately spawned an ethnically segmented social 
and cultural fabric. The role of the state in the creation of the 
underlying conditions of communal conflict is therefore critical to an 
understanding of Guyana’s difficulties. In looking at the state, attention 
is focused not only the policies related to the formation of a multi-
ethnic society, but also on the political institutional apparatus through 
which state power is contested. Specifically, this refers to the 
competitive parliamentary system that was engrafted onto Guyana as 
 
                                                          
2. See Taylor D. M. and Moghaddam F. M., Theories of Intergroup Relations, 2nd 
edition, New York, Praeger, 1994, pp. 95-118. 
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part of the state apparatus and that engaged parties in zero-sum 
struggles for power.  
Guyana is a multi-ethnic Third World state situated on the north-
coast shoulder of South America. Although geographically part of the 
South American land mass, culturally it falls within the Caribbean 
insular sphere marked by plantations, monocrop economies, immigrant 
settlers, and a colour-class system of stratification3. The country is 
populated by six ethnic solidarity clusters – Africans, East Indians, 
Amerindians, Portuguese, Chinese and Europeans. A significant 
« mixed » category also exists, consisting of persons who have any 
combination of the major groups. Racial and ethnic categories are 
apprehended in a rather peculiar way among Guyanese. In the popular 
imagination, everyone is placed within a communal category which, as 
anthropologist Raymond Smith has noted, « is believed to be a distinct 
physical type, an entity symbolized by a particular kind of ‘blood’ »4. 
Hence, even though objectively there is a wide array of racial 
mixtures, a person is soon stereotyped into one of the existing social 
categories to which both « blood » and « culture » are assigned a 
defining role. In a « we-they » dynamic, each person accepts his/her 
assignment to a communal category which in turn separates and 
establishes individual and collective identity from other similar 
groupings. From this, a society of ethno-cultural compartments has 
emerged with various forms of inter-communal antagonisms of which 
the African-Indian dichotomy dominates all dimensions of daily life. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3. Wagley Charles, « The Caribbean Culture Area », in The Caribbean : A 
Symposium, edited by V. Rubin, Seattle, Washington University Press, 1980. 
4. Smith R. T., « Race, Class, and Political Conflict in a Post-Colonial Society », in 
Small States and Segmented Societies, edited by S.G. Neumann, New York, Praeger, 
1976, p. 205. 
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Table 1.1. 
Ethnic Distribution of the Guyanese Population 
Ethnic Group Per Cent of Total 
Indians 51,4 
Africans 30,5 
Mixed Races 11,0 
Portuguese & Europeans 1,2 
Chinese 0,2 
Amerindians 5,3 
 
Source : Ministry of Information : 1980 Census. 
 
 
Nearly all of Guyana’s 850 000 people are concentrated on a 5 
to 10 mile belt along the country’s 270-mile Atlantic coast. The multi-
ethnic population is loosely integrated by an indigenous creole culture 
which has evolved from the admixture of experiences of the immigrant 
population during the last two hundred and fifty years of Guyanese 
history. Sub-cultural patterns of consciousness are dominant in identity 
formation even while social integrative institutions are not entirely 
non-existent. In moments of inter-ethnic confrontation and conflict, the 
strong sub-cultural patterns threaten to burst the society asunder at its 
ethnic seems. The inter-play of integrative centripetal institutions such 
as commonly shared schools along with the fissiparous ethnic cultural 
features such as different religious faiths have created a split national 
personality.  
Slavery and indenture were the twin bases on which successful 
colonization of the climatically harsh tropical coasts occurred. A work 
force of culturally divergent immigrants was recruited to labour on 
plantations in the New World. The different patterns of residence, 
occupation, and political orientations by the imported groups 
reinforced the original differences of the settlers laying from the 
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inception of colonization the foundations of Guyana’s multi-ethnic 
politics.  
By the beginning of the 20th century, certain features were 
clearly embedded in the social system. A communally-oriented, multi-
ethnic society was being fashioned and institutionalized. Several layers 
of cleavage appeared and reinforced each other. Hence, separating East 
Indians and Africans were religion, race, culture, residence, and 
occupation. Multiple coinciding divergencies deepened the divisions 
without the benefit of a sufficiently strong set of countervailing 
integrative forces. To be sure, most immigrants participated in varying 
degrees in a commonly shared school system, national laws, colour-
class stratification system and experiences in suffering. At an 
elementary level there was even a measure of shared cross-communal 
class unity at places where Indians and Africans worked such as 
certain factories or labour gangs. But these were few and far between. 
The trajectory of social organization was firmly launched from the 
multi-layered foundations set in the colonial period. These patterns 
would be sustained by voluntary associations that were formed. 
The logic of the communal society implanted in Guyana pointed 
to a future of inevitable sectional strife. Not only were many layers of 
fairly distinct communal divisions erected, but in the absence of 
equally strong rival overarching integrative institutions, the immigrant 
groups viewed each other from the perspective of their respective 
compartments with misinformed fear and much hostility. The colonial 
pie was small, most of it allocated to the governing European coloniser 
element occupying the top echelon of the colour-class stratified 
system. Of the remaining jobs and other opportunities, the non-white 
segments fought among themselves for a share. African-Indian rivalry 
for the few scarce values of the colonial order would feature as a 
fundamental source of inter-communal conflict from the outset of the 
creation of the multi-tiered communal society. It would be sustained by 
a deliberate policy of divide and rule but would be mitigated by the 
urban-rural pattern of residence especially of Africans and Indians 
respectively. What had evolved assuming the pretensions of a society 
was an order based on sustained and manipulated communal conflict 
without any prospect of overcoming these basic divisions in the 
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foreseeable future. Institutionalised division and embedded conflict 
were the defining features of the system in perpetuity. Or so it seemed 
even at the end of the nineteenth century. 
The twentieth century would witness the unleashing of new 
forces which would erode and eliminate the seemingly permanently set 
colonial structures of dominance in Guyana. The mutual antagonisms 
shared among the subjugated ethnic elements would be diverted 
towards a unique opportunity to unite against the plantation society and 
its rulers. In particular, Indians and Africans under the leadership of 
sectional charismatic leaders acting in unison under the umbrella of the 
same political party would commence a shared struggle to uproot the 
colonial oppressors. Against the trajectory of a divided society 
consigned to perpetual internal strife dominated by a manipulative 
coloniser, a new tidal force of unity was unleashed in the independence 
movement. A common enemy in colonialism impelled the emergence 
of cross-communal leadership which mobilised non-white workers and 
others to challenge the plantocracy, the colour-class value system, the 
unjust distribution of jobs and privileges and all the other iniquitous 
aspects of the multi-ethnic immigrant society. A multi-ethnic 
independence movement called the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) 
was formed under the leadership of two charismatic sectional leaders, 
one an African (Forbes Burnham) and the other, an Indian (Cheddi 
Jagan). They successfully won the first elections, but almost 
immediately after victory engaged in a rivalry over sole leadership of 
the PPP. In the end, this led to a fatal split in the independence 
movement along ethnic lines. The two leaders parted company, formed 
their own party, and thereafter Guyana was transposed into a territory 
riven by deep and destructive ethnic and racial politics. 
The moment of opportunity to build a new basis of inter-group 
relations and a new society was lost when the two sectional leaders 
parted company, formed their own party and pursued their own 
ambition for personal acclaim and power. The moment of 
reconciliation is a rare event in a multi-ethnic state suffused with all 
sorts of underlying predispositions for ethnically-inspired divisive 
behaviour. What makes the loss of that opportune moment even more 
unbearable is the following sequence of events in which the old 
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divisions embedded in the social structure were exploited and 
exacerbated by a new form of mass politics. A new type of party 
emerged constructed on the discrete ethnic fragments into which the 
old unified party had broken. Mass politics invited rival mass 
organizations to capitalize on ethnic loyalties for votes. The new 
system of politics was adopted from a model of political competition 
derived from European contexts marked by an underlying unity and 
consensus. Many colonies with fragmented ethnic sections were 
bequeathed political institutions designed around adversarial zero-sum 
politics. The new parties in Guyana were encouraged to design vote-
getting campaign strategies aimed at capturing a government and 
vanquishing an opponent as in a war of all against all. To win is to 
conquer ; to lose is to die. Ethnic conflicts that are organized and acted 
out in an arena of partisan competition bound by zero-sum rules of 
rivalry tend to exacerbate the underlying deep divisions of the society. 
Party organization and electoral competition together consign an 
ethnically multi-layered polity to a route destined to self-destruction. It 
seems that once the moment of reconciliation is lost, the ethnic 
monster is unleased in the theatre of mass politics wrecking 
uncontrolled havoc negating all efforts at development. 
Political Parties, Apanjaat Politics and Civil War 
In Guyana, like other Third World multi-ethnic states, 
competitive parties formed around a nucleus of members from one or 
another sub-system, do not serve to unify the society or to establish 
legitimate authority. In those societies which are relatively well 
integrated already bound by a widely shared body of basic values, 
political parties have served as effective linkages between the identity 
of citizens and the policies of decision-makers at all levels of 
government. Competitive parties that are formed from exclusive ethnic 
blocs in internally fragmented states such as Guyana do not serve as 
agents of national integration and do not mobilise energies and scarce 
resources for national development. Instead, they exacerbate the 
underlying cleavages and sectionalism. The way they organize their 
lives and those of their constituents in a competitive arena of zero-sum 
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stakes results in the wreckage of all human endeavour aimed at 
developmental amelioration. The new competitive parties in Guyana 
illustrate this well. 
Following the historic split of the national independence party, 
the PPP, two new factional parties emerged around the leadership of 
Dr. Jagan and Mr. Burnham. Each claimed the mantle of the old 
popular and victorious PPP so that at least temporarily there was a 
Burnhamite and a Jaganite PPP. Later, the Burnhamite faction would 
alter its name to the People’s National congress (PNC hereafter), while 
the Jaganite faction retained the PPP label (PPP for Jagan’s faction 
hereafter). After the 1955 split, a general scramble commenced 
between the Jaganite and Burnhamite factions to ensure that Indians 
and Africans respectively stayed with their ethnic leaders. This 
occurred at the same time that each partisan grouping proclaimed its 
adherence to socialist ideals and programmes. 
Notwithstanding the appeals of the PPP and PNC for supporters 
in all classes and from all communities, the reality was that each party 
attracted virtually only Indians or only Africans. With the historic split 
in 1955, the coalition of African and Indian votes that supported the 
old PPP was destroyed. Progressively from 1955 to the present, 
Africans and Indians not only consolidated and completed their move 
to the Burnham (later Hoyte) and Jagan respectively, but also, and 
most importantly, ethnic declarations for these leaders and their 
personalistically – led parties by the Indian and African communities 
became overt and vociferous. 
Sectional identification with the two major parties became a 
fundamental fact of contemporary Guyanese politics. Paradoxically, in 
a political field of self-declared socialist parties, class criteria as a 
determinant of party identification was practically negligible or absent. 
Apanjaat, the local colloquial term for « vote for your own kind », was 
the dominant factor which governed the political choices of nearly all 
Guyanese. Everyone expected an Indian to support and vote for the 
PPP and an African for the PNC. 
The fateful fall into the spiral of intensifying ethnic politics will 
also be facilitated by the role of voluntary associations after the 1955 
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leadership split of the independence movement. Thereafter the 
relationship between political parties and voluntary associations 
accentuated the continued ethnic bifurcation in the Guyanese cultural 
system. All major economic and cultural intermediate associations 
became affiliated directly or indirectly with one or another of the 
political parties in Guyana. The rigidity of this close affiliation was 
underlined by the consistent similarity of policy positions on issues of 
public concern between particular parties and specific interest groups. 
To a substantial extent this was inevitable, since historically each 
section gravitated to and developed around a particular occupation. 
The large economic organizations such as trade unions and the more 
important cultural groups such as religious associations are identified 
today by the public as belonging to the « blackman », the « Coolie », 
or the « Potagee ». 
The spiral of intensifying ethnic conflict slowly but inexorably 
exacerbated by the way the political parties organized the lives of their 
constituents, the manner in which election campaigns were waged, and 
the method by which voluntary associations were enlisted in the 
struggle for communal ascendancy, led almost inevitably to 
cataclysmic inter-ethnic confrontation and civil war. Between 1961 
and 1965, the screws of communal conflict were slowly tightened so 
that few persons could escape being a coopted participant in a system 
of mutual communal hate. Inter-ethnic relations especially between 
Africans and Indians were increasingly marked by covert contempt and 
deceptive distrust. The elements of an impending explosion were 
registered first in the fear of ethnic domination of Indians by Africans 
and of Africans by Indians. A new drama was unfolding in which the 
main motif was a struggle for ethnic ascendancy compounded by a 
politically instigated terror of internal communal colonisation. While 
inter-ethnic interaction was still carried on in the familiar routine of 
daily life, the same persons in the privacy of their homes and 
communities enacted a script of racist and communal antipathy 
drawing every day perilously close to open conflagration. In public, the 
political drums continued surreptitiously to beat on the theme of ethnic 
claims and exclusivity ; in public interaction each side had contrived a 
set of secret intra-communal symbols, idioms and nuanced expressions 
to silently communicate group solidarity erected on an understanding 
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of collective contempt for the other side. Dual roles and schizophrenic 
personalities dwelt simultaneously in an ethnically split society. Forced 
to live together by the designs of a colonial conqueror, the sectional 
elements possessed no experience for inter-communal accommodation. 
Introduced mass politics was betrayed by sectional leaders jockeying 
for power. A moment of opportunity for reconciliation and 
reconstruction was squandered and the innocence of legitimate inter-
ethnic suspicion was nurtured into a monster obsessed with the fear of 
communal dominance. One cleavage after another that separated the 
ethnic segments – race, traditional values, religion, residence and 
occupation – was reinforced by a mode of modern mass ethno-
nationalist politics that drove the society to the brink of self-
destruction. 
After the 1961 elections, in the aftermath of an intensively 
organized ethnicised election campaign and with the promise of 
independence soon thereafter, the victory by Cheddi Jagan’s Indian – 
based PPP posed a fundamental threat to the survival of Africans, 
Mixed Races, Europeans, Amerindians, Chinese and Portuguese. The 
system of electoral politics enabled the victor in a zero-sum game of 
competition to assume complete control of the resources of the 
government. The chance – even a slim one – that this power could be 
perversely applied to systematically and permanently exclude political 
and communal opponents was all that was necessary to mobilise 
massive and crippling opposition to any ethnically-based government. 
In the multi-layered communal order established by the colonial 
power, an inter-dependent economy of specialised parts, each part 
dominated by one ethnic group, was institutionalised. No ethnic group 
could live without the other. 
The PNC Regime and the Institutionalising of  
Ethnic Domination 
After the historic 1964 elections which witnessed the defeat of 
Jagan’s PPP, the new coalition of Forbes Burnham and Peter D’Aguiar 
acceded to power. No attempt was made by the two largest sectional 
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parties, the PPP and the PNC, to forge a grand coalition in a new 
government of national unity. Neither Burnham nor Jagan would serve 
in a subordinate role to each other even though a grand coalition needs 
not involve a hierarchy of leaders. The trajectory of events after the 
1955 leadership split clearly indicated that Jagan and Burnham held 
irreconcilable personal and programmatic differences. The upshot was 
a re-affirmation of the plural society expectation if not prescription of a 
system of government based on ethnic domination. It would not be 
until the middle 1970s that the two leaders would be forced by 
circumstances to come close to reconciliation. 
From mid-1968 onwards, Burnham would preside over a 
minority government kept in office by repeated electoral fraudulence 
and a politicized and ethnically sanitized army and police. Needless to 
point out, democracy was now dead ; its crucial vehicle of 
representation through fair elections, was tampered with. Legitimacy 
was lost ; the state coercive machinery was the main guardian of the 
illegal PNC regime. A minority party seized power. No colonial or 
external power had aided the PNG in rigging the 1968 elections. The 
colonial precedents of manipulating democratic devices to serve 
imperial interests were well learnt by the Burnham government. 
Guyana had come full circle from colonial domination, to freedom and 
back to domination, this time of one non-white group dominating 
another. 
Towards the end of 1969, then, the PNC regime proclaimed a 
socialist framework for Guyana’s reconstruction. In 1970, Guyana was 
declared a « Cooperative Republic ». From private enterprise, the 
economy was to be founded on cooperatives as the main instrument of 
production, distribution, and consumption. But crises continued to 
bedevil the regime. The government ran a gauntlet besieged by high 
unemployment (30 %), under-employment (36 - 40 %), double-digit 
inflation, demonstrations, boycotts, strikes, and later on as a result of 
the Arab-Israeli war, prohibitive fuel costs. A vicious cycle of poverty 
was created by a pattern of polarised and unstable ethnic politics inter-
mixed with the salve of socialist rhetoric and programmatic 
justifications. 
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Between 1971 and 1976, the government nationalised nearly all 
foreign firms bringing 80 % of the economy under state control. This 
unwieldy public sector supplied the job opportunities necessary to 
quell the increasing demands of PNC supporters for equitable 
participation in the economy. State corporations proliferated but most 
were placed under an umbrella state agency called GUYSTAC which 
controlled twenty-nine corporations and several companies valued at 
(G) $ 500 million. Government ministries increased from twelve in 
1968 to twenty-one in 1977. The government also ran five banks, three 
bauxite companies, and a gigantic sugar corporation which at one time 
dominated the country’s entire economy. These public agencies were 
staffed overwhelmingly by the regime’s communal supporters. The 
police, security and armed forces, in particular, were expanded to 
protect the besieged PNC government.  
The judiciary also came under the PNC’s regime’s direct 
influence.The appointment of judges and magistrates was routinely 
based on party loyalty. Thus, the use of the courts to challenge the 
legality and constitutionality of decisions of the regime was futile. The 
overall policy output of the PNC regime, even if it were to be 
interpreted foremost in socialist terms, pointed indisputably to ethnic 
favouritism and preference. The polarisation of the two main ethnic 
races was probably attributable as much to ethnic chauvinism among 
PNC activists as to PPP boycotts and strikes against the government. 
The economic situation had deteriorated so badly that towards the end 
of the 1970s, the impact reverberated adversely on everyone alike, 
regardless of ethnic membership. Strikes and demonstrations and other 
challenges to Burnham’s power increasingly came from all ethnic 
segments including Africans. The arsenal of coercive powers 
previously used against Indians was now used against African 
dissidents also.  
The Critical Elections of 1992 and a Change of Regime 
After three decades of struggle by an array of forces, the ruling 
PNC government was forced to hold free and fair elections in 1992. 
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Forbes Burnham had died in the early 1980s and was succeeded by 
Desmond Hoyte who continued the practice of rigging elections. This 
was however brought to an abrupt halt in 1992. The Atlanta Carter 
Center For Democratic elections was mainly responsible for 
persuading the PNC regime to submit itself to the voice of the 
electorate. In previous elections, the ruling regime was virtually 
permitted to rig elections since this assured the West of a loyal ally in 
the Cold War context. With the advent of Gorbatchev and perestroika, 
however, and the subsequent disintegration of the USSR, the PNC 
government was shorn of its Cold War shield of protection. In a new 
international order of human rights and democracy, the United States 
and the West abandoned their support of authoritarian anti-communist 
regimes and actively promoted governments based on free and fair 
elections. PNC was coerced by its Western backers to convene free and 
fair elections. On October 5, 1992, after two postponements that 
prolonged the constitutional life of the PNC government by two years, 
the elections were finally held. The outcome was dramatic. The PPP in 
coalition with a minor party defeated the PNC bringing to a close 
nearly three decades of illegitimate rule in Guyana. 
The 1992 elections were about the elections – its authenticity 
and its honesty. President Hoyte had argued that previous elections in 
which the PNC had declared itself the victor were fair and honest and 
he therefore had no doubt of the PNC being returned to power in new 
elections. It was this claim that stood at the centre of the elections, that 
is, that the PNC had always acquired power legitimately. The 
opposition parties however equated free and fair elections with the 
defeat of the PNC and argued for the role of an external an adjudicator 
to oversee new elections in Guyana. In a series of prolonged challenges 
to the machinery that the PNC had utilised to retain power in the past, 
ranging from the control of the Electoral Commission to the printing of 
ballot boxes and the counting of the votes at centralised locations, the 
PNC grudgingly made concessions and lost control of the election 
machinery. Shred by shred, integrity was restored to the electoral 
process. In the struggle for procedures to ensure free elections, the 
issue of free elections transparently conducted under the scrutiny of 
international observers became prominently internationalised. 
President Hoyte was cornered by his boast that the PNC was not afraid 
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of free and fair elections. Eventually it was too late and even though 
there was attempt to disrupt the elections at the very last minute, free 
elections were conducted and the outcome was the defeat of the PNC.  
The october 5, 1992 elections attracted eleven contesting parties 
of which the three most significant were the PNC, the PPP, and the 
Working Peoples’ Alliance [WPA]. The Guyanese electorate consisted 
of 385 000 voters. The voters were organised into ten regions and on 
election day ,they cast their ballots for both the national parliament and 
the ten regional councils. The two elections were entwined because the 
sixty-five member unicameral national legislature was constituted of 
fifty three seats elected nationally and the remainder elected by the 
regional councils. Voting was conducted along a system of 
proportional representation.  
As the campaign unfurled, ethnic polarisation of voter 
preference became evident. The results of the elections confirmed the 
pattern of communal voter choice. Given another opportunity, the 
Guyanese electorate decided to allow their choice of parties to be 
dictated by race and ethnicity. The WPA which was a descendant of 
the cross-communal coalition that Walter Rodney had mobilised in the 
1970s to oppose the PNC dictatorship was literally decimated at the 
polls in the reassertion of ethnic voter preference on october 5. It 
obtained only one seat from the national poll and another from the 
regional councils for a total of two seats in parliament. The victorious 
PPP-Civic coalition garnered 36 seats in parliament. The defeated PNC 
obtained 26 seats in parliament. One seat was held by the United 
Force.  
When the Jagan-led government moved into office, everyone 
had expected it to share power with the other opposition parties such as 
the WPA. This did not happen however in part because, the PPP in 
command of an absolute majority of seats in parliament, did not see it 
fit to distribute a significant ministerial portfolio to anyone. It preferred 
to keep control over its cabinet and the direction of the government. In 
the end, the WPA which had done so much to remove the PNC from 
power was entirely excluded from power. This meant that the PPP, 
representing almost entirely the Indian electorate, on acceding to 
office, virtually represented only one section of the multi-ethnic fabric 
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of Guyana. In a very real sense, the elections of 1992 did not succeed 
in structurally altering the proclivity for ethnic politics in Guyana. In 
the victory of the PPP, cross-communal legitimacy was not achieved. 
A broken public will fractured ethnically entails a dark future for the 
PPP regime. Had the PPP sought to recruit the WPA to its fold, it 
would have conferred on itself a measure of cross-communal 
legitimacy. The Jagan-led PPP stands unmistakably as an Indian party 
with Africans, like the Indians under PNC rule, effectively excluded. It 
would be only a matter of time when the African-based PNC would 
submit the PPP to the same sort of acts of non-cooperation that the 
PNC endured at the hands of the PPP in the past.  
The 1997 general elections would provide the occasion and 
opportunity for the PNC confrontation with the PPP. 
The Trauma of the 1996 Elections and  
the Ensuing Quagmire 
The PPP lasted in power for five years up to December 1997, an 
event which many thought was not too likely. It lost its leader, Cheddi 
Jagan, who died of a heart attack in 1996 and was temporarily 
succeeded by Prime Minister Hinds. Much of the economy was 
brought back to health with stability in the currency restored and 
economic growth steady. In the economic area then, the PPP had 
performed with excellence given the bankrupt state of the economy 
upon acceding to power in 1992. What the PPP failed to achieve 
happened in the political arena in bringing the two ethnic communities 
together. Governing by the new Jagan-led government was made 
relatively easy because of the fact that the Afro-Guyanese community 
was thrown into disarray upon the PPP gaining victory. Its ranks were 
sundered when the PNC split apart into a Desmond Hoyte faction and a 
Hamilton Green faction. For much of the first few years of PPP rule, 
the PNC was impotent to seriously distract the government. Hamilton 
Green, a former deputy leader of the PNC, was ejected by Hoyte from 
the PNC and he proceeded to form a separate party which would enter 
into a loose alliance with the ruling PPP. 
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The main area of PPP failure resided in forming a government of 
national unity across the ethnic divide that separated Indians from 
Africans. The PPP had promised to form such a government during the 
historic campaign to oust the PNC from power in 1992. On winning, as 
pointed out, the PPP made few concessions to its erstwhile ally, the 
WPA which had succeeded in winning only two seats in Parliament. 
Yet, it was the WPA which spearheaded much of the opposition to the 
PNC during the latter’s long repressive rule. The WPA, the PPP, and 
several other groupings cooperated to bring down the PNC regime. 
Upon acquiring office, the PPP however failed to share power with its 
erstwhile electoral allies. From the outset, then, the PPP lost many 
influential Guyanese by relying mainly on its own party apparatus and 
a so-called « civic group » to administer the state. To add to the loss of 
the WPA, the PPP dragged its feet in reforming the « imperial 
constitution » against which it inveighed for the past decade and a half. 
The PPP focused instead on reforming the economy which it 
successfully achieved.  
The neglect of the political aspects of power in the reconciliation 
of PPP and PNC followers came back to haunt the PPP after five years 
in power. Hoyte had weathered the challenge from the Hamilton Green 
section of the old PNC following gaining complete control of the 
African population which was now mobilized against the PPP. Without 
Cheddi Jagan but under the leadership of his widow, Janet Jagan, the 
PPP mounted a powerful campaign to gain office again in 1997. The 
PNC having recouped knew that even if it succeeded in mobilizing the 
vast majority of Africans, it would in all likelihood still fail to win a 
majority of seats in Parliament. The PPP benefitted from a decisive 
demographic shift in favor of an Indian majority and the persistence of 
communal sentiments in shaping voter preference. In effect, the PNC 
and its followers faced a permanent minority condition in a polity and 
society that was deeply polarized and with main ethnic communities 
unwaveringly distrustful of each other. 
The 1997 elections saw a PPP victory which the PNC was 
unwilling to accept on a variety of subterfuges. The PNC supporters 
practically seized Georgetown claiming that they had in fact won the 
elections which the PPP had rigged. Independent recounts showed that 
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the PNC supporters were wrong ; the PNC did lose. But, what was at 
stake was not merely an arithmetic count of ballots but the fate of a 
section of the Guyanese people who felt that they were doomed to 
permanent discrimination under a PPP dispensation. The facts of the 
PPP term in office suggested that on balance the PPP was did not 
overly discriminate against Afro-Guyanese. The facts were irrelevant 
however ; the PNC interpreted the facts for its supporters and these 
facts portrayed the PPP as a racist Government. Controlling 
Georgetown and the loyalty of the public service and the coercive 
forces. the PNC was in a position to nullify the election results of 1997 
unless it could gain some access to power. Hovering over the PNC 
intransigence was a fact that made reconciliation very difficult. During 
its demonstrations and riots to nullify the results of the elections, 
widespread violence against Indians eventuated. It was in some ways 
reminiscent of the 1963-64 period when communal violence wreaked 
havoc on the country’s social fabric leaving deep scars and memories 
of hurt. In 1998, the violence was also very injurious to continued 
communal amity. Intersectional distrust had regained the upperhand in 
daily interethnic discourse. 
The stalemate as pointed out in the introduction of this paper led 
to the appointment of an external facilitator to assist Guyanese political 
leaders in re-doing their constitution so as to establish an equitable 
regime in which everyone will feel at home and identify with. In the 
remaining parts of this paper I take up this theme offering an analysis 
and advancing recommendations to establish a political order that can 
restore confidence and democracy in a government for Guyana. 
Guyana can rescue itself from the ravages of ethnic instability 
only by altering the zero-sum exclusionary features of its political 
system. On this subject, much will be said in the concluding chapter. 
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PART II. - DIAGNOSIS AND PRESCRIPTION 
a. - A Zero-Sum Competitive Parliamentary System 
When Guyana obtained independence, the state apparatus that 
was bequeathed to the local rulers was the most highly articulated and 
developed set of institutions in the entire society. However, it was 
trammelled by an institutional political apparatus that tended to 
accentuate the ethnic segmentation in the society. A particular variant 
of the imported parliamentary system fashioned on the zero-sum 
electoral and party system in Britain played a major role in structuring 
and institutionalizing ethnic conflict and competition in the state. In 
Britain, a body of consensual values had evolved nationally serving as 
a means to moderate rivalry over the values of the state. Guyana lacked 
such a system of settlement over basic issues. The rival parties, linked 
to discrete ethnic clusters, confronted each other in a manner similar to 
military warfare over fundamental issues on the form of the society, 
economy and polity. The salient issue was that the mode of conflict 
resolution in collective decision-making that was adopted tended to 
encourage the formation of ethnic groupings which in turn competed 
for outright control of all the values of the state. Zero-sum 
parliamentary contests do not encourage sharing or fixed proportions. 
This meant that the stakes were high in the contest for political power 
and victory viewed as conquest. A system of pre-arranged results with 
guaranteed minimum rewards would have tended to depoliticise the 
intensity and stakes in the contests enabling the defeated a share in the 
polity and society. This is particularly important in a setting where the 
constituent elements in the population are cultural communities which 
share few overarching traditions and institutions. There is controversy, 
to be sure, over the prescription of pre-established shares as a device to 
regulate ethnic conflict, but this tends to occur in societies such as the 
United States and Canada which are already relatively integrated. The 
social structure of these societies bear little resemblance to the 
fissiparous features which characterize the plural societies in the Third 
World. 
The zero-sum parliamentary contest takes place in the electoral 
process resulting in a rising crescendo of ethnic tensions over 
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successive elections thereby exacerbating the sectional divisions that 
already exist. But this not the full extent of zero-sum competition for 
power. The repercussions permeate all aspects of inter-group relations 
in spheres of social inter-action and daily cross communal 
communications which previously were benign. The zero-sum 
electoral struggle, in effect, spills over into and permeates all areas of 
life adding to communal fear, suspicion and stereotyping. To contain 
the competition over power by eliminating zero-sum electoral struggles 
is to constrain and contain the ravages of ethnic strife in a strategic 
area of political life. 
Could not the system of zero-sum competition for exclusive 
control of the state be supplanted by an alternative order based on 
power-sharing ? The post-WW II history of Guyana shows how this 
option availed itself and was lost. In the independence movement, the 
opportunity was created for a formula for sharing office. The PPP 
headed by Jagan and Burnham was however too preoccupied with 
winning the first general elections under universal adult suffrage than 
with inventing a formula for sharing power. Besides, it was not clear 
that the PPP would win the elections. Moreover, while the popular 
euphoria in political campaigning submerged all fears and anxieties 
between Africans and Indians, it was probably unwise to open the 
potentially contentious issue of power-sharing and resource allocation 
and invite unnecessary internal friction in the independence movement. 
For all of these reasons, no attempt was made to develop a 
formula for the sharing of power. This is a familiar situation which was 
also enacted in many multi-ethnic Third World countries that mounted 
unified struggles for independence. In Guyana, almost immediately 
after virtual victory over the antecedent colonial regime, the 
independence party was riven by divisive squabbles over power. 
Because the jockeying was between the two major charismatic ethnic 
leaders, Cheddi Jagan and Forbes Burnham, the rivalry assumed a 
communalist connotation to followers. As the internal struggle 
continued, correspondingly the inter-ethnic mass following was 
fractured. Inter-elite intransigence triggered a situation that they 
literally lost control over. The opportunity to establish a stable formula 
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for power sharing was overcome by events. Once fed into popular 
emotions, the chance of rational solution was greatly diminished. 
In Guyana, the opportunity for power sharing was lost to a new 
order marked by open zero-sum rivalry. After this, the fear of ethnic 
domination became part of the vocabulary of inter-ethnic interaction. 
Stated in this way, the stakes in the competition became co-terminus 
with both the survival of an ethnic group and the state itself. Through a 
few fortuitous events, one section acquired power and retained it 
through the armed forces and fraudulent elections. Thereafter, ethnic 
repression and discrimination ensued and was met by collective ethnic 
retaliation. A spiral of violence and counter-violence had created a 
situation in which all prosperity ceased. 
b. - Resource Allocation 
Apart from the fact that the state was created and marked by a 
system of ethnic stratification from the outset and at independence 
lacked a consensus over its basic institutions, it was also in its totality 
the most well-equipped and endowed apparatus in the society. In many 
ways, the state was larger than the society. Anyone who captured it 
could overwhelm the society bringing it to the service of its own 
particular interests. Civilian institutions were weak and fragmented and 
could not rival the state as a countervailing force. The ecclesiastical 
bodies were divided, the political parties were polarized and the 
voluntary associations weak and dependent. The main rival political 
parties, each representing one or the other of the major ethnic groups, 
recognized the value of capturing the government in its entirety. State 
power was so overwhelmingly powerful concentrated and centralized 
that it could be used as an instrument for promoting personal ambition 
as well as ethnic domination, even genocide. It was this sort of 
predisposing situation in which basic institutional consensus was 
absent and in which ethnic mass parties operated that invited ethnic 
politics in its extreme pathological form. 
The cultural pluralism, the absence of overarching values and 
institutions, and the implanting of zero-sum political competitive 
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institutions can together be conceived as the predisposing factors that 
laid the foundation of ethnic conflict in the state with its attendant 
destructive effects on all development efforts. The factors that 
triggered ethnic conflict were clearly identifiable but occurred at 
different times during the evolution of the problem. These factors 
were : (1) colonial manipulation ; (2) introduction of mass democratic 
politics ; and (3) rivalry over resource allocation. It is necessary to 
conceive of the problem cumulatively in which these factors at 
different points served as precipitating « triggers ». At various times, a 
particular triggering factor deposited a layer of division which in turn 
provided the next step for the deposit of a new layer of forces to the 
accumulating crisis. However, these accumulations could have been 
neutralized if not entirely reversed by some form of deliberate state 
intervention. There was nothing inevitable or automatic about the 
transition from one stage to the next. To be sure, it would appear that 
after a number of successive reinforcing deposits of divisive forces, a 
critical mass in momentum had been attained so that every ethnically 
related issue became magnified and inflammable.  
Despite this, many opportunities for change from this 
compartmentalised stranglehold often avail themselves. There is 
nothing inevitable that the colonially-derived communal system should 
be permanent. Ethnic boundaries are notoriously fluid in rapidly 
changing environments ; ethnically communalized life can be modified 
so as to submit sectional claims to regulation. Deliberate state 
intervention can moderate the combustive properties of ethnic 
mobilisation which ethno-nationalist leaders strive on. One such area 
of planned intervention relates to the allocation of shares and benefits 
bestowed by the state. 
It is difficult to locate precisely the time when the question of 
ethnic shares became an issue in the struggle among the communal 
sections in Guyana. In a sense, the entire colonial pyramidal ethnic 
structure not only embodied resource allocation but explained its 
existence. The colonial state in Guyana was constituted of a 
hierarchical ranking of ethnic groups with the European section 
occupying the dominant position. Through a colour-class system of 
stratification, the skewed distribution of values and statuses was 
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rationalized and regulated. As long as the European retained his pre-
eminent position, African-Indian rivalry was restrained. Besides, the 
separate ethnic compartments provided territorial zones and a buffer 
against direct rivalry. Inter-ethnic suspicion and fear however 
materialised from the moment of Indian entry into the society and their 
subsequent migration from rural areas to towns for government jobs. 
Indians were cast in the role of a late-comer who diluted the 
entitlement of the African. When Africans became acculturated to 
English ways and accepted Christianity and the English school system, 
this gave them strategic entry into public service positions and to many 
urban-based jobs in the private sector. Indian acquisition of English 
education came relatively late only after Africans had already 
consolidated their hold on the lower-level echelon positions available 
to them in the public and teaching services. Indian-African conflict can 
therefore be explained by this competition over public jobs and 
generally public resource allocation.  
As independence approached, it became evident that the 
European section would lose its preeminence. How Indians would 
relate to Africans became a source of anxiety. Already Indians had 
started to acquire westernized skills and education. Some had 
commenced to claim jobs in the public and teaching services. 
Intimations of inter-sectional conflict were already appearing in the 
immediate post WW II period. Especially, rivalry between middle 
class Africans and Indians reared its head at various points in the 
conflict. 
How power and privileges should be distributed between these 
two dominant groups was, in some ways, an open issue. The transfer of 
the British political institutional model meant open competition on 
merit for the allocation of public service jobs. In the long run this was 
bound to challenge African hold on the public service and, given the 
rapid growth and education of the Indian population, convert an 
unranked African-Indian ethnic system into one that was ranked5. It 
would have lent itself not a system of regulated sharing but to a new 
 
                                                          
5. Horowitz D., Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley, University of California 
Press, 1985. 
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hierarchical system of ethnic differentiation. Such an eventuality was, 
however, not inevitable. 
It is easy to overestimate the importance of the material basis of 
ethnic conflict by making it the single most significant factor in 
communal strife as the Marxist-Leninist political economy school 
does. If it were true that this material basis was the main explanation of 
communal conflict, then one would expect that with enough jobs being 
created, this competition and conflict would diminish and disappear. 
The evidence from the Guyana case suggests that in many occupational 
sectors where jobs were available in plentiful supply, African-Indian 
antagonisms persisted. Transposed overseas and no longer in 
competition with each other over jobs and resources, Guyanese 
Africans and Indians continue the ethnic feud with even greater 
intensity. It is therefore necessary to place this resource allocation 
variable in a facilitating role that can be significant but not 
determinative of the outcome of communal conflict. Put differently, 
the regulation of resource competition can act as a significant brake on 
the movement of the society into polarised warring camps.  
c. - Need for Capability to Suppress Inter-ethnic Violence  
Ethic violence seems to have a special combustive property to 
overwhelm all rationality and engulf the entire society in total war of 
all against all. For this reason, control of ethnic strife to non-physician 
disagreements is essential to the prospect of restoring harmony. 
Besides, open warfare tends to add a new almost indelible encrustment 
of complaints and grievances that drive communities farther apart. 
To be sure, there was considerable ethnic tension among 
Guyana’s communal sections, but much of this during the colonial 
period was regulated by rituals of interaction that confined and 
concealed the strains. For all practical purposes, Guyana like many 
ethnically segmented societies, was quietly but perpetually at war with 
itself. Surrogates for physical violence suffused the system. These 
encompassed such forms as rivalry around the celebration of their 
respective religious holidays, competition in business and government, 
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etc. Stereotypes which tended to belittle and depreciate entire 
communal sections nevertheless served as a defense mechanism that 
offered a private and quiet victory of the mind over the communal 
opponent. However, they also tended to dehumanize ethnic enemies 
setting the stage for violence. When democratic politics and mass 
parties were introduced and ethnically-based parties emerged, these 
underlying stereotypical antipathies were harnessed to them. The new 
collective forces accentuated ethnic hostilities. Competition at 
elections tended to provide the occasion for these antagonisms to be 
vented openly ; often political campaigns seemed like military 
engagements. All of this always kept the society unstable lingering on 
the brink of violence. 
Collective ethnic violence occurred in civil war proportions in 
Guyana in the 1963-64 period as the two major political parties 
confronted each other over the control of the government. In many 
ethnically-mixed villages where a preponderance of either Indians or 
Africans resided, ethnic violence or its threat occurred against the 
minority group. This sort of « ethnic cleansing » led to the migration of 
these minorities from these villages adding to the concentration of self-
segregated communal residential settlements in Guyana. For many 
months protracted ethnic violence convulsed the small multi-ethnic 
state until foreign British troops were called into restore order. 
For many Guyanese, the civil war marked by ethnic violence 
was a traumatic event that led to irreversible commitment to communal 
solidarity. While it was true that throughout Guyanese history, 
Africans and Indians maintained tense relations marked by mutual 
suspicion and covert hostility, the outbreak of physical violence 
seemed to have crossed a psychological threshold of no return to cross-
cultural cordiality. 
A new level of ethnically oriented physical violence was 
unleashed in Guyana when in 1968 the African-based PNC 
government, with police and army support, rigged the elections. The 
legitimacy of the government was lost and opposition challenges 
mounted. Over the next decade the size of the coercive forces 
expanded dramatically. Expenditures for them increased by over a 
thousand times. What emerged was a state apparatus, having lost its 
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legitimacy, that sought to maintain its power and control by repressing 
its communal enemies. The Burnham regime, however, did not go 
about physically exterminating its ethnic enemies. Rather, a system of 
non-violent terror was established to control the behaviour of its 
opponents. State institutions such as the courts were ethnically 
politicized and converted into instruments of communal 
discrimination.  
State terror and threat of violence were met by Indians’ response 
in the sabotage of the economy. Since the economic system during 
colonial times was crafted so that there was a coincidence of economic 
specialization and ethnic concentration, this meant that unless all 
segments cooperated, the economy could fall apart. Hence, African 
control of the public service was utilized as the lever to destabilise the 
Indian-based Jagan government, while Indian control of the sugar and 
rice industries was used to sabotage the African-led Burnham 
government. Economic inter-dependence invited mutual sabotage. 
The impact of persistent Indian strikes and boycotts in their 
economic sector accompanied by mass migration and the loss of 
essential skills from Guyana reverberated adversely on all ethnic 
groups alike. Economic collapse imparted universal suffering. African 
workers, who like Indian workers under the Jagan government that 
supported discriminatory policies, soon felt the full brunt of the 
diminishing economy and a bankrupt government. When they went out 
on strike for more pay and for job security, the state apparatus turned 
its coercive arsenal against them. When the regime unleashed its 
violence against its own communal members, it did so as if they were 
misguided and that they betrayed an ethnic trust. The communal 
members of the regime who opposed the government were made 
special objects of terror and violence. They were treated as traitors 
with a sort of passion and hate that only brothers could concoct against 
each other. 
The state in this instance did become strong to contain dissent 
especially that which came from its ethnic adversaries. Clearly, 
capability to contain violence is not the unqualified prescription to 
regulate violence in multi-ethnic states. One additional ingredient is 
vital. That is the institution charged with administering law and order 
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including the police and the judiciary should be multi-ethnic in 
composition. In some ways this is almost an impossibility to 
implement because those who govern are likely to have relied on the 
ethnic composition of the coercive institutions in bringing them to 
power. To alter the composition of these institutions may be 
tantamount to committing political suicide. There is however no way 
around this kind of a policing force apart from one supplied by an 
external mediator such as the United Nations. In the end this can only 
be a temporary device albeit one that can recruit and train a multi-
ethnic force so as to detribalise it and render it neutral and formidably 
effective in controlling all outbreaks of ethnic violence. 
C. - Will and Compromise 
One of the grievous harms caused by persistent and protracted 
strife in a multi-ethnic society, is the loss of will and capability to 
reconcile. After many years of ongoing communal struggle, it would 
appear that a sentiment of fatalism enters through the backdoor of 
consciousness compelling the battered psyche to accept the ethnic 
battle lines and many adaptations to it as inevitable and permanent. A 
new socio-cultural architecture of human settlement and communal 
interaction had emerged with ethnic roles and social institutions 
defined in neat niches of unholy compromises and concordances. 
Usually, while the struggle continues, an odd sort of social stability in 
personal and group relations emerges and persists. It is, in effect, a 
dual-level social structure, one marked by clever cordiality, the other 
more subterranean, marked by communal anger, hate, plots and silent 
violence. 
A broken will, enfeebled and unprepared for reconciliation, 
emerges reinforced by countless symbols of old battles, won and lost, 
as well by organizations and interests which institutionalize and 
structure the conflict. To be sure, at any earlier time, the leaders and 
elites in the various ethnic communities were able to communicate and 
beat out compromises for inter-communal co-existence. But as the 
conflict continues and deepens, even this upper layer becomes a victim 
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of inter-communal intransigence. The ethnic monster devours everyone 
in the end. 
Compromise and cooperation are the very heart of the 
developmental process. This is true of all social structures, integrated 
and divided alike. The democratic fabric itself is constituted of not 
only substantive give and take in beating out public policy, but this is 
undergirded by a culture and psychology of mutual trust in exchanges. 
The mortar of cooperation and compromise maintains the integrity of 
the edifice of society. In the multi-ethnic states of the Third World, the 
tension in working out mutually satisfactory exchanges is often over-
strained by the fact the cleavages and differences are ethnicised. 
Protracted institutional ethnic conflict is the stuff out of which a 
culture and psychology of cooperation is undermined rendering 
collective development difficult if not impossible. 
Compromise and cooperation are embodied in devices for 
conflict resolution. In Guyana, compromise and cooperation came 
alive and was implemented in the first unified independence movement 
under the original PPP. Internal differences accompanied by external 
manipulation torpedoed the coalition of personalities and interests that 
held the PPP together. Thereafter, even in the midst of the ethnic 
division that ensued, there have been many efforts at restoring the old 
compromises in unity, but as one party captured power and especially 
after it maintained it by electoral fraudulence, the two ethnic groups 
drew farther apart and the periodical talk of a government of national 
unity assumed the air of a mechanical public relations exercise. Each 
group settled into its own ugly niche in an ethnically-influenced 
structure, that in a weird way sustains each other. With the will to 
compromise broken, the new forms of conflict resolution assume the 
form of a divorce. 
The Guyana Anti-Model 
Theorists must be willing to examine both failed and successful 
cases in ethnic conflict to adduce evidence towards a framework of 
ethnic conflict resolution. In this regard, the Guyana case can be 
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conceived as « an anti-model ». It tells more of what not to do since 
Guyana committed many of the critical false steps that catapulted the 
state towards a disastrous destination. As an « anti-model », the 
Guyana case points to the destructive role of leaders who pursued 
private ambition before the long term interests of citizens in a unified 
state. The leadership factor is clearly critical ; it almost alone was 
accountable for both successful communal mobilisation of each section 
making it possible to pressure the colonial power out of Guyana, and at 
the same time it was primarily culpable in launching the state into an 
irretrievable tailspin of ethnically-ignited passions that led to collective 
catastrophe.  
If it is true that in the actions of the main communal leaders after 
they won the elections of 1953 they led Guyana down the road to 
communal self-immolation, it is equally accurate to assert that in the 
immediate pre-1953 elections period they had discovered a formula for 
inter-ethnic unity. This was incorporated in the organization of the 
independence movement itself. The lessons show that multi-ethnicity 
is not inevitably destructive. It can be harnessed for constructive ends. 
In Guyana, ethnic sentiments were mobilised during the independence 
movement and harnessed to a multi-ethnic mass party that promised to 
mobilise the collective energies of citizens from the culturally diverse 
communities towards the development and transformation of the state. 
In the successful effort at cross-communal accommodation between 
1950-53 resides suggestive ingredients for a theory of consolidation. 
How did a broadly-based cross-communal party emerge ? What factors 
featured in the amalgam and which ones were critical and peripheral in 
the process ? Can the process be replicated and generalised to other 
multi-ethnic states ? The Guyana case from 1950 to 1953 does 
generate some important insights such as the role of recognising the 
identity and interests of the separate communities ; the importance of 
leaders in the different communities to subordinate their private 
ambitions to the larger goal of maintaining peace in a just distribution 
of values ; the value of compromise and a mechanism to resolve 
ongoing disputes free from the immediate pressures of outbidders and 
mass passions ; the search for a mutually agreeable formula for sharing 
jobs, titles, and political offices ; the need to exclude external actors 
who tend to intervene for their own goals ; and the importance of 
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evolving institutions and practices for a shared citizenship. The 
presence of some of these factors but the absence of others together 
caused the independence movement disintegrate into discrete ethno-
nationalist parts. The Guyana « anti-model » also points to the lack of 
understanding of the dynamics of the ethnic factor once it has been 
aroused and directed to promote rival communal claims for jobs, self-
protection and self-assertion. It was clear that the communal leaders 
while cultivating and feeding the ethnic monster for practical gain 
could not constrain it to rational appeal and national reconstruction 
thereafter. They became victim to a monster of their own creation : Did 
they understand that the nature of the ethnic creature was as 
uncontrollable and volatile as it turned out to be so that they were not 
masters of it but were in time captured by it instead ? The Guyana case 
describes the descent into a vertigo of self-reinforcing ethnically-
charged forces once ethnic solidarity was entertained for narrow 
political gain. Political leaders in multi-ethnic states can learn from the 
Guyana « anti-model » as well as from similar cases about the 
irrational features of the ethnic factor. Ethnic solidarity can contribute 
to identity formation and energize a state towards development when 
properly harnessed but when antagonistically attached, as almost 
inevitably tends to be the case, to rival communities occupying the 
same territory and government, it can wreak irreparable harm and 
havoc. 
The Guyana « anti-model » has its institutional lessons. While 
on one hand it can be argued that a participant democratic system is 
essential for the establishment of legitimate authority and for the 
mobilisation of citizens for development challenges, it is clear from the 
Guyana case that an institutional competition party system with its 
zero-sum implications for the distribution of power and privileges is 
inappropriate for the maintenance of elementary order and stability in 
multi-ethnic states. After the leadership split between the two 
communal leaders in 1955, probably more than any other factor, 
successive electoral campaigns conducted in a zero-sum warlike 
combat, exacerbated ethnic strife in Guyana. 
In the Guyana experience between 1950 and 1953, an example 
of consociation and accommodation was successfully experimented 
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with. Institutional engineering can seek to depoliticise many areas of 
contention such as minority rights, distribution of jobs and contracts, 
and the protection of cultural identity, etc. In the consociational 
arrangement set forth by Arend Lijphart, the main ingredients of an 
accommodation are a coalition government and a system of 
proportional sharing of values6. A coalition is clearly required and its 
forms and variations can be many. Its main limitation pertains to the 
secret diplomacy that accompanies the deliberations of sectional elites 
in working out the terms of a compromise package for rule. The 
« proportionality principle » in the Lijphart model of consociation 
pertains directly to problems in the Guyana « anti-model ». A familiar 
interpretation of the ethnic conflict in Guyana coming from Marxists in 
the political economy school argues that the struggle for material 
rewards explains the struggle. Put differently, if the issue of rewards 
can be settled or depoliticised, then the conflict will disappear. The 
Guyana « anti-model » case illustrates the limitations of the « politics 
of preference » or « resource allocation » school. It aptly points to the 
irrational nature of ethnic conflict showing that even where material 
resources cease to be a variable, in the context of the shared poverty of 
both Indians and Africans, the communal strife persisted. To be sure, 
resource allocation has served as a major instigator of ethnic conflict in 
Guyana especially among the middle classes of both Indians and 
Africans. When Indians and Africans migrated to overseas destinations 
and became well-off and were no longer in competition with each 
other for scarce resources, they continued their communal antipathies 
and animosities. 
Perhaps what better explains the persistence of the ethnic 
conflict from a materialist and a resource allocation perspective is the 
idea of « comparative advantage ». Even when ethnic communities 
identified with a particular regime have been impoverished, they would 
continue to support « heir government » simply to keep out an 
alternative regime with a better potential for performance but 
associated with an ethnic community. The role of this comparison 
 
                                                          
6. Lijphart A., Democracy in Plural Societies, New Haven, Yale University Press, 
1977. 
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factor in interethnic relations has been usefully located within what 
social psychologists call « social identity theory ». In this explanation, 
the theory begins by affirming the need of the human creature and an 
ethnic community for a distinctive positive social identity in a process 
of social differentiation and categorization. Society is perceived as a 
place of conflict rather than cohesion. The theory attempts to explain 
inter-group behavior through psychological processes such as 
identification, social comparison, and the need for distinctiveness. 
Social psychologists Taylor and Moghaddam strike the significance of 
this pattern of behavior for inter-ethnic group relations underscoring 
the importance of comparison in this process : « Since only through 
social comparison is social identity meaningful, it is the relative 
position of groups that is important. Therefore, competition and 
conflict are seen as essential aspect of the intergroup situation »7. In 
this scheme, it is postulated that the individuals seek positive 
evaluations of themselves and « through intergroup comparisons, 
individuals will come to view their own group as psychologically 
distinct and, in relation to relevant caparison groups, they will try to 
make the in-group more favorable »8. This critical ethnocentrist idea 
underscores the need for identity to be established and asserted by 
favorable comparisons leading to discriminatory inter-group behavior 
in quest not merely of parity but superiority. 
Social psychologists have pointed to a critical aspect of the 
comparison factor that explains the propensity of group loyalty to be 
sustained intensely and irrationally not for « greater profit in absolute 
terms » but in order « to achieve relatively higher profit for members 
of their ingroup as compared with members of the outgroup »9. Put 
differently, and in part this explanation addresses some of the 
intransigence and excesses in Guyana, Bosnia, and other places with 
recurrent communal conflicts, it is not important that a group sees that 
rationally its behavior in a conflict is inimical to its interests but what 
 
                                                          
7. Ibid. 
8. Ibid. 
9. Tajfel H., « Social Identity and Intergroup Behavior », Social Science 
Information, Vol. 13, n° 2, April 1974. 
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is more salient is that its adversary not be advantaged over it. Much of 
the claims for recognition and equity seem to be elucidated to this 
dynamic. Often occurring in a context where the conflicting groups 
shared the same territorial state and in which a particular distribution 
of statuses and resources prevailed, the struggle pivots around an 
unwillingness of one party to permit the other profit advantageously by 
its actions. The comparison factor assumes a logic of its own 
witnessing and wreaking, as if infused by jealousy, incredible havoc 
and harm on all parties in a policy of mutual denial.  
The Guyana « anti-model » also contains abundant materials on 
the process of withdrawal and escape mainly through mass migration. 
Engaged in an intense struggle that damages the well-being of both of 
the ethnic communities economically and psychologically, Guyanese 
sought refuge everywhere and anywhere. Some left for adjacent 
Suriname, Venezuela, and Brazil, while most migrated legally and 
illegally to North America. They voted with their feet literally having 
lost the franchise at home. The important part has been in the loss of 
the best resource in the country adding to the impoverishment of the 
Guyanese people. To those who ruled and who survived as opposition 
politicians, the lesson was clear. Population loss means the debilitating 
destruction of the state in an area that defines the very viability of its 
existence – the loss of people in haemorrhaging proportions. The 
people who left, many middle class, were however the very people 
who espoused ethnic attachment but who now found it convenient to 
escape from the very abode that they had lit afire. The paradox of the 
situation underscores the larger point that the ethnic monster consumes 
its own children and makes a mockery of ethno-nationalist pretences to 
patria and group loyalty. In the end, everyone wants out. The highest 
aspiration of the Guyanese child is not to be physician or professor but 
simply to escape by migration. This aspect of the « anti-model » has 
created among Guyanese as a whole much cross-communal cynicism 
of politicians and the polity. The very « outbidders » who appealed to 
ethnic sentiment and mobilised followers to hate and violate the ethnic 
enemy runs away from the holocaust that he/she ignites. The true 
believer in ethnic solidarity becomes nauseated to the extent that 
he/she takes flight. Ethnic loyalty and fanaticism spawns its own 
disloyalty and alienation. Another feature of generalisable use that can 
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be derived from the Guyana « anti-model » refers to the manner in 
which early initial and limited ethnic actions progressively spreads like 
a cancer to take over and reorganise the entire state into communal 
compartments. At all levels, parties, unions, associations, parliaments, 
the public service, private businesses, corporations, armies, churches, 
etc., the entire system and all its institutions are suffused by the ethnic 
toxin. To be sure in early colonial times, the seeds of division were laid 
so that residential, occupational, and value cleavages separated the 
communities. What the ethnicisation of a state entails is the release of 
the arsenal of latent prejudices into active hate and discrimination, 
erecting a garrison state of ethnic encampments and armies. Little 
room for tolerance and cross-communal institutions exists thereafter. 
The system is choked to death by its own arteries filled with hate. The 
Guyana « anti-model » teaches that the ethnic factor is appropriately 
likened to the embrace of a hostile octopus. Some of the tentacles 
spread everywhere and squeeze the state into paralysis. At the same 
time that the ethnic sectors are consolidated and fossilised by the 
ethno-nationalist parties and leaders, hypocritical talk of cross-
communal amity increases among the very politicians who promote 
ethnic loyalty. 
This brings in the element of « hypocrisy » displayed in the 
Guyana « anti-model ». Both the ruling and opposition parties in 
Guyana’s ethnically bipolar state openly professed to be Marxist with 
class-based interests but were in fact preponderantly ethnically-based 
groupings. They spun out an elaborate system to parade a picture of 
representing and promoting cross-sectional interests. They decorated 
their organisations with a facade of officers from the other cultural 
community. They sported Marxist-Leninist jargon ad nauseam and in 
public conducted their debate as if ideological issues were most 
significant. Overseas observers bought into this cynical circus but not 
local citizens who knew what the game was about. This practice of 
deliberately camouflaging the colour of partisan politics is probably a 
pattern of public denial that is found in democratic politics in other 
multi-ethnic Third World countries. What the Guyana « anti-model » 
suggests is that the leaders are quite aware of what course of action is 
morally correct but cleverly seek to conceal their defiance of this moral 
ethic by engaging in repugnant hypocritical behaviour. The ethnic 
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monster is seen by all as loathsome yet it is indulged. Ethno-nationalist 
leaders are allowed to parade before the international community not 
as pariahs who pander to ethnic and racial sentiments but as persons 
pretentiously in genuine pursuit of toleration and cross-communal 
nation-building. The Guyana « anti-model » suggests the need for a 
critical monitoring of such hypocritical behaviour and the exposure of 
them internationally. That apart, the Guyana case points to a moral 
dilemma that ethno-nationalist leaders face on one hand needing to 
pander to ethnic appeals to retain sectional popularity and on the other 
needing cross-communal endorsement to obtain regime legitimacy and 
to govern effectively. 
Yet another perspective that can be derived from the Guyana 
« anti-model » pertains to the role of international actors in 
exacerbating the internal divisions in a multi-ethnic state. External 
actors, be they other states or private groups, have their own interests 
to pursue. They are sometimes economic predators such as those multi-
national corporations which see some benefit from taking one side or 
the other in the communal conflict. There are also political predators 
such as regional states which may have geo-political designs in 
entering an ethnically-ignited internal fray. Also, and very frequently, 
there are diaspora communities that spilled over from the ethnic 
conflict and have been created in enclaves in other countries. In North 
America, many Guyanese citizens have settled in ethnic ghettoes and 
engage in support roles in sustaining the ethnic conflict at home. The 
Guyana case points to the internationalisation aspects of the ethnic 
conflict in all of its diverse dimensions. The Cold War actors found 
surrogate partisan support in the ethnically split Guyanese state. This 
was a main force in exacerbating communal tensions. The regional 
geo-political factor was played by Venezuela and Suriname. And even 
today the diaspora Guyana communities in North America and Britain 
play an active part providing funds in persistence of ethnic strife in 
Guyana. In effect, the Guyana anti-model draws attention to the 
proposition that internal ethnic conflicts tend to invite external actors 
which may add fuel to the ethnic division in the state. This is not to 
argue that the impact of external actors is always negative. Sometimes, 
external intervention is required to prevent genocide or even to offer 
third party assistance in conflict resolution. On balance however, as the 
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Guyana case suggests, the persistence if not exacerbation of the ethnic 
strife is often caused by the role of external actors in the 
internationalisation of the conflict. 
Finally, the Guyana « anti-model » suggests an examination of 
the related issues of partition and secession. At one time, partition 
seemed to be a desirable solution and on one occasion an Amerindian 
group sought secession from Guyana in order to join Venezuela. The 
Guyana case shows the potential, probably not as well as other cases 
such as Nigeria and Yugoslavia, of ethno-nationalist movements 
mutating into separatist claims. Often this is either a consequence of 
attempted genocide or an invitation to genocide. In either case, 
partition, secession and genocide all carry ethnic conflict to the brink 
of no-return in reaching reconciliation. Once civil war has broken out, 
secession sought, and genocide committed a new qualitative stage in 
the ethnic conflict has been reached.  
Together, and in other ways, the Guyana « anti-model » is 
pregnant with lessons of what not to do lest disaster in manifold 
economic, political, and psychological dimensions be courted. The 
Guyana case raises anew the familiar question of what makes a society 
cohere and makes a society truly a society. Through colonial rule and 
arbitrary boundary-drawing and population transfers, most of the 
multi-ethnic Third World states have been created. They face the 
problem of designing an appropriate political system to accommodate 
the rival claims of their terminal ethno-nationalist communities. The 
record in this regard is one replete with the wreckage of Third World 
states which have instead succumbed to communal violence and 
instability, ethnic domination and repression, and instances of genocide 
and secession. This can be avoided. First the ethno-nationalist force 
must be understood in its workings and dynamics, and second the 
knowledge can be applied at ethnic conflict resolution and inter-
communal co-existence. Without this first step, there can be no 
development. The Guyana case offers insights into the challenge of 
national-reconciliation and nation-building and national development 
in the Third World. 
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Résumé 
 
Cette étude propose une 
analyse des problèmes fondamentaux 
du système politique guyanais, et 
suggère des orientations susceptibles 
de générer une évolution vers une 
réconciliation inter-ethnique et une 
consociation politique. Le nœud du 
problème réside dans l’établissement 
d’un gouvernement généralement 
acceptable, juste et démocratique, et 
ce dans un contexte où les composan-
tes communautaires sont profondé-
ment méfiantes, tant en Guyane que 
dans des Etats similaires des Caraïbes 
comme Trinidad et le Surinam. La 
situation actuelle englobe des 
problématiques sensibles relatives au 
statut et à la reconnaissance des 
communautés ethno-culturelles : ces 
dernières expriment des craintes de 
discrimination et de domination, et 
des soupçons quant à l’équité des 
politiques étatiques en matière 
d’allocation des ressources. Sauf à 
détruire l’Etat, la tâche fondamentale 
est de concevoir un modèle de 
gouvernement qui satisfasse les 
revendications divergentes formulées 
par les différentes communautés en 
matière d’équité et de représentation, 
la manière dont elles voient les 
choses. Pour partie, l’objet de la 
présente étude est précisément 
d’explorer les possibilités de mettre 
au point un tel système. 
 
 Abstract 
 
This paper offers an analysis 
of the fundamental problems of the 
Guyanese political order and suggests 
directions in which change towards 
interethnic reconciliation and politi-
cal consociation may proceed. The 
crux of the problem pertains to the 
establishment of a generally accepta-
ble, just, and democratic government 
in the midst of deeply distrusting 
communal components in Guyana and 
similar states including Trinidad and 
Suriname in the Caribbean. Implica-
ted in all of this are vexing issues 
related to status and recognition of 
the ethno-cultural communities which 
express fears of discrimination and 
domination as well as charges of 
skewed state policies regarding 
resource allocation. Short of 
destroying the state, the basic task is 
to design a framework of government 
that will acccomodate the divergent 
claims of the respective communities 
for equily and representation, the way 
they see it. In part, the point about 
this paper is precisely to explore the 
possibilities of designing such a 
system. 
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